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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DISCRIMINATION AS TO
LOCALITIES - COUNTY APPORTIONMENT
lannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 20 N.Y.2d 244,
229 N.E.2d 195, 282 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1967).
Justice Frankfurter once cautioned the United States Supreme
Court against entering the field of legislative reapportionment.'
He reasoned that if the Court were to declare existing apportion-
ment schemes invalid and provide legislative bodies with correct
schemes of apportionment, such actions would "catapult the
lower courts of the country [into al . . . mathematical quagmire
... without so much as adumbrating the basis for a legal calculus
as a means of extraction. ' However, Frankfurter's warnings were
in vain, and in 1962, the Supreme Court entered the reapportion-
ment field.3
Since that entry, several monumental decisions have been
handed down by the Supreme Court regarding reapportionment.4
The most notable and most often quoted is Reynolds v. Sims.5  The
Reynolds case found the Supreme Court declaring invalid both the
Alabama apportionment scheme then in existence and a new plan
which would have ameliorated the disproportions only in the Ala-
bama House. The Court held that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral legislature must, under the equal protection clause of
the 14th amendment, be apportioned substantially on a population
basis.' That the Reynolds decision had a far-reaching effect on
the State legislatures of the several States cannot be controverted 7
The question now before the State courts is whether the "one
man, one vote" principle announced in Reynolds is applicable to
' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
2 Id. at 268 where Frankfurter stated: "To charge the courts with the task of accom-
modating the incommensurable factors of policy that underlie these mathematical
puzzles is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to judges."
3 The Court held in Baker v. Carr that the plaintiff-voters had standing to sue, that
their allegations of debasement of their votes presented a justiciable question, and that
the federal district court had jurisdiction of the subject matter. Id. at 204-06.
4 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Alabama); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); Roman v. Simcock, 377 U.S. 695
(1964) (Delaware); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia).
5377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6Id. at 568.
7 See generally Smith, Role of the Federal Courts in the Reapportionment of State
Legislatures, 53 ILL. B.J. 656 (1965); Note, State Apportionment - The Wake of
Reynolds v. Sims, 45 Bos'r. U.L. REV. 88 (1965).
COUNTY APPORTIONMENT
local representative bodies.' The courts of New York have taken
the lead in declaring that the principle does apply9 and the New
York Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed this position in
Iannucci v. Board of Supervisors.'0
The lannacci case was a combination of two cases" in which
the validity of the apportionment schemes of the Boards of Super-
visors of Saratoga and Washington Counties were questioned.
Both of these boards were originally apportioned under a New
York statute which provided that each municipality would be rep-
resented on the board of supervisors of that county by one repre-
sentative supervisor. 2 It is important to note that under this law
each town or city was to have only one representative regardless
of its population."8
In lannucci, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that
the apportionment of the board of supervisors of their respective
counties was unconstitutional and an order directing the boards to
submit a valid plan of apportionment.'" Relief was sought on the
8 See Ellis v. Mayor and City Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965) (invalidating
city council of Baltimore); Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965) (chal-
lenge of election system at county level in Pennsylvania); Reed v. Mann, 237 F. Supp.
22 (N.D. Ga. 1964) (county unit system invalid); Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149
(W.D. Okla. 1963) (weighted voting system declared invalid); Griffen v. Board of
Supervisors, 60 Cal. 2d 751, 388 P.2d 888, 36 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1964) (county board of
supervisors membership based on towns was invalid); Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich.
616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966) (board of supervisors held invalid); Mauk v. Hoffman,
87 N.J. Super. 276, 209 A.2d 150 (Ch. 1965) (board of freeholders held unconstitu-
tional); Baily v. Jones, 81 S.D. 617, 139 N.W.2d 385 (1966) (county commissioners
must be elected, not appointed); Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132 N.W.2d
249 (1965) (county board of supervisors not elected by population was invalid).
9 See Graham v. Board of Supervisors, 49 Misc. 2d 459, 267 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Sup.
Ct. 1966) (Erie County); Town of Greenburgh v. Board of Supervisors, 49 Misc. 2d
116, 266 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Westchester County); Augastini v. Laski, 46
Misc. 2d 1058, 262 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (Broome County); Shilbury v.
Board of Supervisors, 46 Misc. 2d 837, 260 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (Sullivan
County); Goldstein v. Rockefeller, 45 Misc. 2d 778, 257 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct 1965)
(Monroe County).
10 20 N.Y.2d 244,229 N.E.2d 195,282 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1967).
11 The individual cases were Iaonucci v. Board of Supervisors (Washington County)
and Saratogian, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (Saratoga County). These cases were com-
bined since the facts were essentially the same and the relief asked for was identical.
Id. at 248, 229 N.E.2d at 195, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
12N.Y. CouNr Y LAW § 150 (McKinney 1954). Stated in full the law reads as
follows: "The supervisors of the several cities and towns in each county, when lawfully
convened, shall constitute the board of supervisors of the county."
13 In Washington County the town populations varied from 11,012 in Kingsbury
to 426 in Dresdon, and in Saratoga County the population ranged from 16,000 in the
town of Saratoga Springs to about 600 in the town of Day. 20 N.Y.2d at 249, 22.9
N.E.2d at 196, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
14 Id. at 248, 229 N.E.2d at 197, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
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ground that the vote of a resident of a less populous municipality
was worth several times more than the vote of a resident of a more
densely populated area."6 The appellate division of the supreme
court held that both the scheme of apportionment prescribed by
the county law and a weighted system of voting at the county level
violated the "one man, one vote" principle announced in Reynolds
v. Sims.'6 The Court of Appeals of New York, with three judges
dissenting, 7 affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Several important questions arise from this seemingly innocu-
ous decision. The first is whether the Reynolds principle of "one
man, one vote" is applicable to local governments. It should be
pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has thus far re-
fused to declare that the principle is applicable 8 and has stated
that "[v]iable local governments may need many innovations, nu-
merous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in
municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions."' 9
Distinguishing between local legislative bodies and local nonlegis-
lative bodies,2" the Supreme Court, in Sailors v. Board of Educa-
tion,2 held that the "one man, one vote" principle was not appli-
cable to local nonlegislative bodies22 and carefully avoided stating
that the Reynolds principle was applicable to legislative bodies at
the municipal level.
The Court refused to apply the Reynolds rule to local legisla-
15This contention was founded upon simple arithmatic: if 1,000 voters elect one
representative in one municipality, and 10,000 voters elect one representative in an-
other municipality, obviously one vote in the former town is 10 times greater in weight
than one vote in the latter town.
161annucci v. Board of Supervisors, 27 App. Div. 2d 546, 279 N.Y.S.2d 458
(1967).
While weighted voting cures the previous favoritism in areas of smaller
population, it by the very system itself creates new inequities in terms of
power. Representatives of the larger districts, because of the weighting of
their votes, necessarily have greater influence over passage of legislation.
The result is discrimination against the smaller districts. Id. at 547, 279
N.Y.S.2d at 459.
17 Breitel, Van Voorhis, and Burke.
18 See, e.g., Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387
U.S. 105 (1967).
19 Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1967).
20Id. at 108.
21 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
22 In Sailors, plaintiffs sued to enjoin as violative of the 14th amendment's equal
protection clause a Michigan statute under which the defendant school board was cho-
sen. The Supreme Court held that "[s]ince the choice of members of the county
school board did not involve an election and since none was required for these non-
legislative offices, the principal of 'one man, one vote' has no relevancy." Id. at 111.
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tive bodies once again in Dusch v. Davis.23  In that case the repre-
sentative at large plan of Virginia Beach was questioned as being
violative of the "one man, one vote" principle. 4 The representa-
tive at large plan or the "Seven-Four Plan" as it was called, pro-
vided for each of four councilmen to be elected by a vote of the
entire electorate of the city." However, the remaining seven coun-
cilmen were to be elected from the borough in which they resided.26
The Supreme Court held that although the boroughs varied greatly
in population, the four citywide councilmen might well balance
this disproportion in population."
It is evident that the Supreme Court has adopted a policy to-
ward local legislative bodies quite different from its attitude re-
garding State legislatures.2" At the State level the "one man, one
vote" principle has been strictly adhered to. On the local level,
however, legislative bodies have been permitted to follow a more
liberal interpretation of the Reynolds rule. This more liberal in-
terpretation permits experimentation with various forms of repre-
sentative government."
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's refusal to strictly apply
the Reynolds rule at the local level, most State courts have rigidly
applied the "one man, one vote" principle to political subdivi-
sions.no It has been stated that:
23387 U.S. 112 (1967).
241d. at 113.
251d, at 115.
26 Id.
27d. at 117. The Court stated that "[t]he Seven-Four Plan seems to reflect a
detente between urban and rural communities that may be important in resolving the
complex problems of the modern megalopolis in relation to the city, the suburbia, and
the rural countryside." Id.
2 8 See Snyder & Pearson, Effect of Malapportionment Cases on Political Subdivi-
sions of the State, 39 CoNN. B.J. 1 (1965). These authors stated:
Two tests used by the Supreme Court in the Reynolds group of cases are:
(1) What percentage of the voters or population is able to elect a bare ma-
jority of the legislative body and, (2) What is the population-variance ratio
of the largest and smallest legislative districts? In order to comply with the
Reynolds rule 50.01% would be the ideal answer to tst No. 1, and 1:1 ratio
would be the perfect answer to rest No. 2. Id. at 4-5.
Obviously, the Seven-Four Plan in Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967) would not
satisfy these two tests.
29 This experimentation might take the form of a pure representative at large plan
where all representatives are elected by the entire population. Or, a modified repre-
sentative at large plan may be adopted in which some of the representatives would be
elected on an at large basis while other representatives would be elected by the con-
stituency of the district in which they reside. The possible representative schemes at
the local level are limitless.
3 0 See cases cited notes 8 & 9 supra.
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There is strong reason to believe that the apportionment stand-
ards which apply to states also apply to municipalities that (1) ex-
ercise general governmental functions and (2) are designed to be
controlled by the voters of the geographic area over which the
municipality has jurisdiction. Counties, towns, cities and villages
meet these tests. They are fundamental organs of government
within the state; they exercise a large measure of the state's power,
and because of the services rendered, are a medium of government
most often in direct contact with the people.31
The court in lannucci justified its decision that the Reynolds
rule is applicable to local government by referring to the Supreme
Court cases,3" by noting past adherence to this rule by the courts
of New York,"3 and by directing the reader to the arguments made
by Professor Weinstein in a law review article on the subject.34
For these reasons the court in Iannucci held the New York statute
invalid and ordered the boards to reapportion accordingly. 5
The decision of this court was sound. "[Alfter all, if there is
a serious voter debasement in a political subdivision of the state,
is there any good reason to permit it at the local level and condemn
it at the state level?"36 The Reynolds rule does not require strict
mathematical equality between districts,"7 so there is still room for
experimentation with various forms of government at the local
level as long as those schemes to be tested can meet the Reynolds
principle.
After the two boards in lannucci were ordered by the lower
court to reapportion, each adopted a "weighted voting plan."
Washington County adopted an "adjusted weighted voting plan"
and Saratoga County devised a "fractional weighted voting plan."38
Both plans were similar in nature. In each plan a town's repre-
sentative was given one vote for every predetermined unit of pop-
ulation.3" The net result was that the representatives from the
31 Weinstein, The Effects of Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties and
Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLuM. L. REV. 21,23 (1965).
32 20 N.Y.2d at 249, 229 N.E.2d at 197, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
33 Id.
34 Id., citing Weinstein, supra note 31.
35 Id. at 249, 229 N.E.2d at 198, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 506; see text accompanying
notes 11-17 supra.
36 Snyder & Pearson, supra note 28, at 16.
37 "While it may not be possible to draw ... districts with mathematical precision,
that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution's plain objective of making equal repre-
sentation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal .... ." Westberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (requiring congressional districts to be equal in popu-
lation within each State).
38 20 N.Y.2d at 249, 229 N.E.2d at 197,282 N.Y.S.2d at 505-06.
39 Washington County's plan provided that each supervisor would be entitled to
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larger municipalities received a greater number of weighted votes
since there were more units in their respective constituencies.
In Ianuacci, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that these
proposed weighted voting plans were invalid unless the respec-
tive boards were able to prove their constitutionality." The
court reached this conclusion based on its earlier decision in Gra-
ham v. Board of Supervisors:4 1 In Graham, a system of weighted
voting had been proposed and the New York court held that such
a system may have hidden "inherent defects."'  Although the
court in Graham did not specify what such "inherent defects"
might be, the court in lannucci did so enumerate. The court said
that "It]he principle of one man, one vote is violated ...when
the power of a representative to affect the passage of legislation
by his vote, rather than by influencing his colleagues, does not
roughly correspond to the proportion of the population in his con-
stituency."'  The court feared that the larger city representatives
would have such great power by their weighted vote alone that the
rural areas might never have an effective voice in government.44
The loss of an effective political "voice" by rural areas can be
illustrated quite clearly: "In some cases, in fact . . . [weighted
voting] is an empty gesture; it distributes votes which apparently
represent voting power to which the citizens are entitled but which
actually give the representative no power whatever to influence
legislative decisions."" Voting power is defined in this context,
one vote for every 279 persons residing in his town, up to a maximum of 15 weighted
votes. In Saratoga County each supervisor would cast one vote for every 600 persons
residing in his town with a maximum of 20 votes. The membership of both boards
would be enlarged ff a town warranted more than the maximum number of weighted
votes. Id. at 249,229 N..2d at 197,282 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
40 Id. at 253, 229 NY.E2d at 199, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
41 18 N.Y.2d 672, 219 N.E.2d 870, 273 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1966). Here boards were
apportioned under N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 150 as were the boards in lannucci. The
court in Graham declared this scheme invalid and temporarily approved a weighted
voting plan until such a time that a new system could be proposed.
42 18 N.Y.2d at 674,219 N.E.2d at 871,273 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
48 20 N.Y.2d at 252, 229 N.E.2d at 199,282 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
4 4 Take for example a simplified situation of a county having four cities. A
weighted voting plan is established with three representatives having three votes each
and the fourth representative having one vote. A majority of the votes is required to
pass legislation. In this situation the fourth representative with one vote will never
affect the passage or defeat of legislation. It will always be determined by a combina-
tion of two of the other three representatives. On the surface the Reynolds rule has
been complied with, yet in practice the constituency of the fourth representative will
never have a true voice in government
45 Banzhaf, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 Rur-
GEMS L REV. 317, 324 (1965) (emphasis added).
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not merely as to how many weighted votes a representative has,
but how many times a representative can influence the passage of
legislation in relation to the number of voters he represents.46
Such a determination of the ratio of how many times a representa-
tive can affect the passage or defeat of legislation to the number of
people he represents can only be determined by experts using com-
puters.
47
The objections to weighted voting as enumerated by the Gra-
ham and lannucci courts are valid. Without a computer analysis
a representative's true voting power cannot be measured. There-
fore, in order to insure the constitutionality of a proposed scheme,
the lannucci court stated that a computer analysis must be pre-
sented to determine the validity of the system proposed.4" Such a
requirement would guard against any denial of a voter's privilege
to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 14th amend-
ment.
Since a computer analysis would be required to prove a system's
constitutionality, the lannucci court was next faced with the ques-
tion of who would be required to present such an analysis: the
plaintiff-voters or the defendant-boards of supervisors. The boards
claimed that the duty was on the voters. The boards based their
argument on Johnson v. City of New York 9 where the court stated
that "legislatures should not be declared unconstitutional unless
it dearly appears to be so; all doubts should be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of an act.""
The court in lannucci distinguished the Johnson case on its
facts and held that it was incumbent upon the respective boards
to prove the constitutionality of their proposed schemes."' The
court based its decision on the fact that in Johnson the presump-
tion of the constitutionality of legislation came from the "principle
that it is improper for a court, in passing upon a constitutional
4 6 
"The measure sought is a measure of voting power only in a limited situation:
it is a measure of the power of an individual representative to affect the passage or
defeat of legislation when the outcome depends only on the sum of the votes cast by
the representatives." Id. at 328.
47 See generally Weaver & Hess, A Procedure for Nonpartisan Districting: De-
velopment of Computer Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 288 (1963).
48 20 N.Y.2d at 254,229 N.E.2d at 200,282 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
49 274 N.Y. 411, 9 N.E.2d 30 (1937) (proportional system of voting challenged
system upheld).
5o Id. at 430, 9 N.E.2d at 38.
5120 N.Y.2d at 254, 229 N.E.2d at 200, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 510. The Iannucci
court held that the systems of voting involved differed so greatly that the cases could
not be compared.
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question, to lightly disregard the considered judgment of a legis-
lative body which is also charged with a duty to uphold the Con-
stitution."5  The Iannucci court felt that a considered judgment
was impossible where the legislature failed to obtain a computer
analysis and therefore "[alt the very least, there is a significant
possibility that the plans are actually defective. . .. Under these
circumstances, the boards are not entitled to rely on a presumption
that their legislative acts are constitutional."5  It is obvious that
the lannucci court implied that a considered judgment is only pos-
sible when the legislatures have a computer analysis on which to
base their apportionment legislation.
The dissenting judges took issue with the majority's holding
that the boards of supervisors were required to produce a computer
analysis.5 They based their argument on Fortson v. Dorsey55 and
suggested that the best form of government at the local level would
only be found through experimentation. They also indicated that
the majority's requirement that the Reynolds rule be upheld will
unduly restrict such experimentation.
The majority, however, by requiring a computer analysis to
be presented has not precluded any particular form of government
at the local level. Rather, the majority concluded that experimenta-
tion is acceptable at the local level, but before a plan can be tested
in practice it must be constitutional in theory. One writer has
stated the argument as follows:
Without some further and more persuasive explanation of how
such systems are supposed to provide equal voting power and ef-
fective representation to all of a state's citizens, the court should
strike them down as an inconclusive experiment with the constitu-
52 Id. at 254, 229 N.E.2d at 200, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 510 (emphasis added).
53 Id. at 253, 229 N.E.2d at 200, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 509; accord, Silver v. Brown, 63
Cal. 2d 270, 405 P.2d 132, 46 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1965), where the court held that an
apportionment scheme would carry with it at least a strong presumption of validity.
A later court in Silver v. Reagan, 67 Cal. 2d 455, 432 P.2d 26, 62 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1967)
held that any strong presumption of validity as stated in Silver v. Brown is destroyed
by large discrepancies in the size of legislative districts.
5420 N.Y.2d at 255, 229 N.E.2d at 201, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 511 (dissenting opin-
ion).
55 379 U.S. 433 (1965). The Supreme Court held that the burden of proving the
invalidity of a proposed reapportionment plan was upon those bringing the action.
Id. at 439. Contra, Swann v. Adams, 263 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1967) where the
court stated: "The State has failed to present... acceptable reasons for variations among
the populations of the various districts in the plans of the Legislature for apportion-
ment." Id. at 226.
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tional rights of citizens in cases where the inequalities outweigh
any legitimate social interests which might be served.50
The next question concerns the court's duty in obtaining a com-
puter analysis. The prevalent opinion seems to be that "courts
ought to initially refrain from granting direct relief and allow the
state legislature another opportunity to reapportion in accord with
the federal constitution. Should such a response not be forth-
coming, however, a court may be forced to grant direct relief...
affirmative judicial apportionment and districting."'
Professor Sidney Hess"' feels that two methods of computer
analysis could probably be used by the legislatures at the local
level to determine the validity of a proposed scheme."9 One
method would be by computer simulation. This approach would
necessitate the use of the random number generator on the com-
puter itself. The process would involve random selection of pos-
sible voting combinations in which one town's vote would deter-
mine the passage or defeat of a particular piece of legislation.
The second method Would entail determining how many times
in the past each town was able to affect the passage or defeat of
legislation. This information would then be programmed for the
computer and would reflect the disparities in relation to the num-
ber of times a town was able to affect the passage or defeat of leg-
islation to the size of its population. Such information could then
56 Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts - Do They Violate the "One Man,
One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1338 (1966) (emphasis added).
57 Weaver & Hess, supra note 47, at 289.
58 Professor Hess was interviewed on behalf of this writer by Mr. Burnham Allport,
a graduate student in operations research at the Wharton School of Finance of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. Professor Hess received his Ph.D. in operations research from
Case Institute of Technology in 1960, participated in the computer work involved
in the Delaware reapportionment, and is currently teaching operations research at the
Wharton School.
59 These observations were made in view of the computer analysis sheet presented
in the opinion of Dobish v. State, 53 Misc. 2d 732, 279 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Cr. 1967).
The computer used in connection with the first method is an I.B.M. System 360
Model 50. Professor Hess estimated the cost of using this computer at $200.00 per
hour. A purely speculative estimation of the money involved in a simulation process
would be about $100.00. As to the second method proposed, more time would be
needed in programming but the computer time itself may only be about 4 minutes.
Simple mathematics show that 4 minutes of computer time would cost about $13.20.
A further example of the cost involved can be found in Castellan, Political Appor-
tionment by Cornputor, 1 BROWN U. COMPUTING REV. 5 (1966). The author stated
"a sample problem of a part of New York State was solved in five minutes on the I.B.M.
System/360 Model 50." Id. at 20. Castellan went on to predict that there will exist
within "the next few years . . . a fast, inexpensive, non-partisan computor technique"
even better than those currently in use. Id. at 21.
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be used to determine the weightipg of votes. But, because of the
difficulty and time involved in obtaining each town's voting record,
the former method would be preferable to the latter.
In conclusion, lannacci v. Board of Supervisors stands for
three principles. First, the "one man, one vote" principle of Reyn-
olds v,. Sims is applicable to local legislative apportionment schemes.
Second, where a system of weighted voting is proposed by a local
legislative body, it will be incumbent upon that body to prove that
the system conforms with the "one man, one vote" principle. Fi-
nally, such proof may only take the form of a computer analysis
showing that the number of times a representative can affect the
passage or defeat of legislation is in proper relation to the size of
the population he represents.
The lannacci decision is a wise one. That the Reynolds prin-
ciple should be applied to local legislative bodies is proper since
this level of government has the most contact with the citizenry
and therefore should be truly representative. To allow the imple-
mentation of an apportionment scheme designed to correct the
constitutional inadequacies of an existing plan, where the proposed
scheme itself may not be constitutionally adequate, is foolishness.
Therefore, computer analysis should be required to show that the
proposed apportionment scheme conforms with the Reynolds
principle before it is implemented. To hold otherwise could re-
sult in a situation where the remedy is worse than the situation to
be cured.
WILLIAM W. ALLPORT
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